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DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE USE OF RACIAL
PROXIES IN POST-MCRI ADMISSIONS
Matthew S. Owen & Danielle S. Barbour* †
The Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (“MCRI”) amended the Michigan
Constitution to provide that public universities, colleges, and school districts
may not “discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin
in the operation of . . . public education.” We argue that, in addition to prohibiting the overt use of racial preferences in admissions, the MCRI also
prohibits using racial proxies such as socioeconomic status or a “Ten Percent Plan” that aim to prefer minorities in admissions.
Though the MCRI does not expressly say so, we stipulate for this paper
that its language prohibits universities from overtly considering race in any
way when making admissions decisions. It remains unclear, however, what
other conduct might be barred by the MCRI. In particular, it is unsettled
whether the MCRI would prohibit using proxies or other race-neutral criteria designed to aid minority candidates in admissions. Would a plan similar
to the “Texas Ten Percent Plan,” which accepts all in-state students who
graduate at the top of their high school classes, violate the MCRI as a proxy
for racial preference? What about giving applicants a bonus for socioeconomic disadvantage or overcoming adversity? Does purpose matter? These
questions are vital to universities trying to achieve racial diversity in a postMCRI world. The answers will depend mostly on how state courts interpret
the MCRI’s language on “discrimination” and “preferential treatment.”
We contend that using proxies for race would violate the MCRI. Like
Justice Souter (dissenting in Gratz v. Bollinger), we believe using disguised
proxies creates a system in which “the winners are the ones who hide the
ball.” To demonstrate how legal challenges to the use of proxies might be
resolved, we first set out the analytical framework courts should use when
approaching these questions. We then explain why the use of racial proxies
is impermissible under the MCRI.
I. Choosing the Right Standard
Because the MCRI is new law, courts need to give its language
interpretive meaning. As a practical matter, they must decide whether the
MCRI modifies an existing body of law (e.g., state civil rights law or equal
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protection jurisprudence), and to what extent they must fashion a new body
of law to give it force. We consider and reject one possible rule that sees the
MCRI as a limited modification to equal protection jurisprudence under the
Fourteenth Amendment. As explained below, we believe the MCRI modifies
existing state anti-discrimination law. Therefore, courts should import
Michigan law’s disparate treatment and impact standards to admissions
policies challenged under the MCRI.
The first possible rule, which we reject, sees the MCRI as a limit on
state action otherwise authorized by Grutter v. Bollinger. Under this view,
courts would interpret the MCRI as a slight modification to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Michigan could no longer argue that the use of racial classifications, a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause, should
nevertheless pass strict scrutiny if they are narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest in diversity. This interpretation would put Michigan after
the MCRI in the same position as Texas after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Hopwood v. Texas, which invalidated affirmative action on equal protection
grounds. But this interpretation, by relying on the Fourteenth Amendment’s
asymmetrical treatment of minority and majority racial groups, would permit the purposeful use of proxies or something like the “Texas Ten Percent
Plan,” whose constitutionality the Court acknowledged in Gratz.
The MCRI’s text does not support this interpretation. First, there is always an obvious peril in allowing the meaning of a state constitutional
amendment to be dictated entirely by its catalysts rather than its words—an
interpretive tool without limits. But more importantly, we believe the
MCRI’s language supports applying the basic framework of Michigan civil
rights laws as they now exist. The MCRI speaks not of equal protection, but
of “discrimination” and “treatment”—the vocabulary of anti-discrimination
laws. Also, critically, its remedies section provides as follows:
The remedies available for violations of this section shall be the same, regardless of the injured party’s race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin,
as are otherwise available for violations of Michigan anti-discrimination
law.

This direct reference to state civil rights law (the Elliot-Larsen Civil
Rights Act) and the civil-rights language militate against reading the MCRI
as a narrow provision overruling Grutter. Instead, it creates a new state constitutional right to be free from state discrimination. And through its
juxtaposition of favorable and unfavorable discrimination and promise of
equal access to remedies, the MCRI requires symmetrical treatment for all
racial groups.
II. Disparate Impact and Proxies for Race
Established Michigan law already prohibits many kinds of discrimination against racial groups through the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act,
which—like its federal counterpart—recognizes two theories of recovery for
racial discrimination in employment and education: “disparate treatment”
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and “disparate impact.” Michigan courts often interpret the state act as conforming to the federal version, and thus we will treat both as relevant and
persuasive authority.
The same analytical framework applies to both state and federal antidiscrimination law. A plaintiff seeking to prove discrimination through “disparate treatment” in the employment context must show that an employer’s
facially disparate treatment of employees of different races is motivated by a
discriminatory purpose. “Disparate impact” requires the plaintiff to show
that the consequences of a particular policy fall more harshly on a protected
class, and that the employer cannot justify the policy by business necessity.
Under Michigan law, proof of an impermissible purpose is not required to
recover on the disparate impact theory.
Given this framework, one could argue that MCRI only bans policies
that facially prefer candidates by race, because its language only refers to
“preferential treatment” (we call this the “Facial Only Reading”). If the
word “treatment” must have meaning, its meaning must be that—in contrast
to discrimination—the only preferences MCRI prohibits are those manifested through disparate treatment. This construction would achieve the
same result as Hopwood, allowing proxies for race like the “Ten Percent
Plan,” because these admissions policies are facially neutral.
The fundamental flaw with the Facial Only Reading is that it tries to
draw a novel distinction between preferential treatment and discrimination.
While giving each word of a statute independent meaning is an ordinary
principle of statutory construction, it is inappropriate here, where both terms
already have a settled meaning. Preferential treatment has always been discrimination. The Supreme Court noted in Griggs v. Duke Power Company
that “discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what [civil rights legislation] has proscribed.” Thus, trying to
give separate meaning to these two terms is a fruitless exercise that needlessly complicates the interpretive undertaking. Rather, the outcome of a
challenge under the MCRI turns on three questions: (1) whether the MCRI
distinguishes between majority and minority groups; (2) how a prima facie
case of discrimination in admissions may be shown; (3) how that prima facie case may be rebutted. Because, as noted above, we do not believe the
MCRI distinguishes between racial groups, we turn to the latter two questions.
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
MCRI by showing that a particular admissions has a disparate impact on his
racial group. The MCRI prohibits “discrimination against” racial groups,
and its symmetry requirement ensures that this protection is available to all
applicant-plaintiffs. Because the MCRI does not say “discriminatory treatment” but merely “discrimination,” we can infer that it imports the disparate
impact theory of recovery for discrimination currently available under state
law. This theory would apply to suits by whites challenging the use of raceneutral admissions plans.
We also believe that it would be appropriate for Michigan courts to require proof of a discriminatory motive in a disparate impact case, much like
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in equal protection jurisprudence. This requirement would permit universities to use good-faith admissions criteria that are genuinely race-oblivious
without having courts decide what admissions factors are really important,
and which are too trivial to justify discrimination.
Under both state and federal anti-discrimination laws, once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of a disparate impact, the burden would shift
to the defendant university to prove that the challenged practice is justified
by business necessity—a kind of heightened scrutiny. How might a court
apply this scrutiny in the MCRI context?
When rebutting a prima facie case, a defendant university might argue
that its use of racial proxies passes heightened scrutiny because it has the
legitimate purpose of achieving diversity by favoring minorities in admissions. This argument is consistent with traditional interpretations of civil
rights laws that also permitted overt racial preferences. But because we do
not find in the MCRI any basis for a diversity-seeking exception, we think a
proxy clearly motivated by racial diversity will not justify discriminatory
preference.
First, Congressional intent, the typical basis for permitting a goal of diversity under Title VI, in inapplicable to an MCRI analysis. Proponents of
the Facial Only Reading would look to the definition of “discrimination”
and accompanying standard of review under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,
which applies to university admissions. As an initial step, this is perfectly
logical. The Supreme Court has held that affirmative action in university
admissions does not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act unless it also
violates the Constitution because “discrimination” under that Title is coterminous with the Equal Protection Clause. Leeway for disparate treatment in
favor of minority groups under Title VI goes to constitutional limits. But the
basis for this interpretation—which comes from Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke and which the Court reaffirmed in Grutter—is that Congress intended discrimination under Title VI to mean “constitutionally
impermissible discrimination.” This logic cannot be a sound method for interpreting “discrimination” under the MCRI because, quite obviously,
Congress did not write the MCRI. Its basic purpose—to end the use of otherwise constitutional racial preferences—is much different than Title VI’s
aim: to enforce existing constitutional limits. There is no reason to import
those exceptions to outlawed discrimination that are based solely on legislative intent to a popular referendum. Further, defining MCRI discrimination
by the very cases it overrules—Bakke and Grutter—would be untenably
perverse.
Moreover, in case you were hungry for reductio ad absurdum, using the
“constitutional” standard to inform the interpretation of “discrimination” in
the MCRI would vitiate its purpose. If discrimination means “unconstitutional
discrimination,” why wouldn’t preferential treatment mean “unconstitutional
preferential treatment?” And since limited racial preferences in admissions
don’t violate the constitution, they shouldn’t violate the MCRI either. We
know that can’t be right, so we must look elsewhere for a standard of review.
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Unlike the federal Civil Rights Act, which is separated into different Titles for education, employment, race, gender, etc., each with its own
developed and often different jurisprudence, the MCRI makes a blanket
statement. By banning discrimination or preference in “public employment,
public education, or public contracting,” the MCRI most plausibly intends
that there be one standard for all of these areas. Thus, even if federal law
were an appropriate place to look for a standard of review, it is not obvious
that Title VI (as opposed to Title VII, for example, which deals with employment discrimination) would be the right source. Once outside the safe
harbor of Title VI’s “limits of the Constitution” standard, affirmative action
programs encounter a tougher review from courts, especially where their
sole purpose is to achieve and maintain racial diversity. For example, in Title
VII’s employment context, when a prima facie case of “reverse discrimination” has been made, the Third Circuit has held that an employer’s
affirmative action program is invalid under Title VII where it aims to promote diversity rather than to remedy discrimination. Even the exception for
remedial programs under Title VII is largely based on Congressional intent,
which is absent from the MCRI.
We note the example above from the Third Circuit not because we think
Title VII is obviously the right source from which to import a standard of
review for the MCRI. In fact, it could not be: remedial affirmative action is
unconstitutional in state school admissions unless the institution itself has a
history of discrimination. Rather, we find the example illustrative because it
demonstrates the slim margin by which universities can use racial preferences. In a recent opinion terminating an injunction delaying the
enforcement of the MCRI, the Sixth Circuit observed that using racial preferences in admissions is something universities only “narrowly may do”
under the Constitution. The MCRI is much broader than the narrow language necessary to overrule Grutter (“means of achieving the goal of
diversity must be facially neutral”). It is far too blunt an instrument to make
so fine a cut: carving out the barely constitutional practice of candidly preferring racial minorities in admissions, but nothing more. Instead, it creates
a new, colorblind regime for state involvement with race in Michigan. That
has consequences beyond simply doing away with overt preferences.

